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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-512
3 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, NFIB
FROM:
 Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Monthly Activities Report
 April 1979

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This forwards the April 1979 monthly activities report
for the DCI Security Committee.

Attachment



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Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When
Separated From Attachment

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DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
MONTHLY ACTIVITIES REPORT
APRIL 1979

1. At the request of the DCI, unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information during the period from December 1977 through March 1979 were analyzed to determine if there were any patterns. Review of CIA, NSA and DIA files indicated that 19 leaks during that time period were of major significance in terms of damage to sources or methods, formal requests for investigation, or both. Examination of these 19 leaks showed no clear patterns. Most of them were on subjects which were topical at the time of the leak. No one journalist or publication appeared to have a consistent inside track in terms of access to sensitive information. Damage resulting from these leaks ranged from negligible to very serious. In three cases, reports suggested a near-term cause and effect relationship between published leaks and loss of collection capability. [REDACTED]

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2. In the interest of better Community coordination of leak identification, assessment and investigation, the Security Committee agreed to upgrade its working group on unauthorized disclosures to standing subcommittee status and to enlarge its charter appropriately. The Director, NSA, nominated a member of the staff of his General Counsel's Office to chair the new organization. The offer was accepted with pleasure, and the chairman designate is working with the Security Committee staff on his charter and on organizational and administrative matters bearing on his responsibilities. [REDACTED]

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3. The Compartmentation Subcommittee completed and reported out to the Security Committee a proposed revision of DCID 1/7 to provide policy guidance to the Community on the dissemination and use of intelligence information. [REDACTED]

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4. The Committee staff distributed to the Community briefing manuals for a new product sub-compartment, following coordination with COMIREX representatives on the extent of dissemination of simulated user product and of electrical transmission procedures. Community agencies were provided guidance on how to begin clearance action for personnel requiring access to the new system. []

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5. Agreement was reached on a final version of the draft security procedures to be issued by the Chief Justice for use by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is expected to become operational during the spring of 1979. Coordination was effected with the Department of Justice and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to provide personnel and physical security support to this Court. []

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6. The Committee staff completed security inputs to COMIREX on identifying "sensitive parameters" delineating threshold levels for release of imagery from compartmented channels. A draft has been submitted to the Community for coordination. []

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8. The Committee was briefed on and the Committee staff has reviewed damage assessments concerning East German espionage agents surfaced in March 1979 as having access to sensitive NATO information (e.g., [] case). Suggested corrective measures proposed by the Department of Defense were endorsed. []

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
9. Continuing support was provided the NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation. The Committee Executive Secretary, in his capacity as security advisor to that group, participated in a two-day meeting of the working group at [] [] for the purpose of resolving major issues and of preparing an outline of the final report. []

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11. The Committee's Investigative Standards Working Group began a study of the disparities between and the effectiveness of reinvestigation programs in Community agencies. 

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